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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 09-1466 
________ 
 
DOROTHY RHUE ALLEN,  
by her Attorney in fact, James Martin,  
Individually and as a class representative on behalf  
of others similarly situated, 
                                                                            Appellant                                                                                                                          
v. 
 
LASALLE BANK, N.A;  
CENLAR FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK FSB;  
FEIN, SUCH, KAHN AND SHEPARD, PC;  
JOHN DOE SERVICERS 1-100; 
JOHN DOE LAW FIRMS 1-100 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-08-cv-02240) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
________ 
 
Argued September 14, 2010 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, BARRY, and SMITH  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 12, 2011) 
________ 
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Lewis G. Adler  (Argued)  
Woodbury, N.J.  08096 
 
Roger C. Mattson 
Woodbury, N.J.  08096 
 
 Attorneys for Appellant  
 
Andrew C. Sayles  (Argued) 
Gregory E. Peterson 
Connell Foley 
Roseland, N.J.  08068 
 
 Attorneys for Appellee Fein, Such, Kahn and Shepard, 
P.C. 
 
Daniel C. Green 
Vedder Price 
New York, N.Y.  10019 
 
Chad A. Schiefelbein  (Argued)  
Vedder Price  
Chicago, IL  60601 
 
 Attorneys for Appellee LaSalle Bank 
 
Gregory A. Lomax 
Christopher L. Soriano 
Morgan J. Zucker 
Duane Morris 
Cherry Hill, N.J.  08003 
 
 Attorneys for Appellee Cenlar Federal Savings Bank 
_______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
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This appeal presents the question whether a 
communication from a debt collector to a consumer‟s 
attorney is actionable under the Federal Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).  
 
I. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 1976, Dorothy Rhue Allen purchased her home with 
a 30-year mortgage.  After Allen failed to make the last 
payment due, she was declared in default.  On May 7, 2007, 
Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, PC (“FSKS”), a law firm, 
brought a mortgage foreclosure action against Allen on behalf 
of LaSalle Bank.
1
 
 
 At the request of Allen‟s attorney, FSKS sent a letter 
to Allen‟s attorney on June 7, 2007 that set forth a payoff 
quote for the principal balance remaining on the loan and 
other charges due to the servicer of Allen‟s loan, Cenlar 
Federal Savings Bank (“Cenlar”), as well as charges for 
FSKS‟s attorney fees and costs.  The same day, FSKS sent a 
second letter to Allen‟s attorney itemizing the attorney fees 
and costs referred to in its previous letter.  Less than three 
weeks later, Allen filed a class action counterclaim and third 
party complaint in the foreclosure action, asserting that 
FSKS‟s response violated the FDCPA and state law.  LaSalle 
and FSKS then released the mortgage and moved to dismiss 
the foreclosure action, after which the New Jersey Superior 
Court dismissed Allen‟s claims without prejudice.   
 
 Some time thereafter, Allen filed a class action against 
FSKS, LaSalle, and Cenlar in the United States District Court 
                                                 
1
 Although Allen alleged in her Complaint that LaSalle 
Bank was her mortgage lender at the time of her default, she 
also asserted that LaSalle took assignment of Allen‟s 
mortgage from Security Pacific National Bank on June 12, 
2007, after FSKS filed the mortgage foreclosure action.  
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for the District of New Jersey.  In the Complaint, Allen 
alleged that FSKS and LaSalle violated the FDCPA and state 
law, and that Cenlar also violated state law.  For example, 
Allen alleged that FSKS demanded: $910 in attorney fees 
when court rule permits only $15.43, $335 for searches when 
court rule permits only $75, $160 for recording fees when the 
actual fee was only $60, and $475 for service of process when 
statute and court rule limit reimbursement to $175.  Although 
she made other specific and general FDCPA allegations in her 
Complaint, Allen conceded at oral argument that her FDCPA 
claims were predicated only upon alleged violations of 15 
U.S.C. § 1692f(1). 
 
FSKS moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that 
Allen had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  FSKS asserted that a communication from a debt 
collector to a consumer‟s attorney is not covered by the 
FDCPA.
2
   
 
The District Court noted that the courts of appeals are 
divided on this issue.  The Fourth Circuit has held that a 
communication with a debtor‟s attorney is to be treated as an 
indirect communication with the debtor and therefore 
actionable.  Sayyed v. Wolfpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 
232-33 (4th Cir. 2007).  In contrast, the Second Circuit has 
stated in dicta and the Ninth Circuit has concluded that 
because an attorney will protect a consumer from a debt 
collector‟s behavior, statements made only to a consumer‟s 
attorney are not actionable per se.  Guerrero v. RJM 
Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934-39 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129-31 (2d Cir. 2002).  
                                                 
2
 Cenlar and LaSalle independently moved to dismiss.  
LaSalle moved to dismiss on the ground that Allen had failed 
to state an agency relationship between it and FSKS because 
LaSalle took assignment of Allen‟s mortgage only after FSKS 
sent the letters to Allen‟s attorney.  Cenlar moved to dismiss 
the state law claims because of the lack of contract between 
Allen and Cenlar and because Allen alleged no damages. 
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Eschewing either approach, the District Court found 
persuasive the Seventh Circuit‟s analysis in Evory v. RJM 
Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007), 
where the court held that although a communication from a 
debt collector to a consumer‟s attorney is governed by the 
FDCPA, it is to be analyzed from the perspective of a 
competent attorney.  Using that reasoning, the District Court 
held that a competent attorney would have readily recognized 
the overcharges that FSKS sought.  The Court concluded that 
because Allen‟s attorney protected her from any unfair or 
unconscionable means used to collect the debt, Allen had 
failed to state viable FDCPA claims.  The Court thus 
dismissed those claims and abstained from passing on the 
alternative arguments set forth by FSKS and LaSalle in 
support of their motions to dismiss.  With no federal claims 
remaining, the Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Allen‟s state law claims.  Allen appeals.3 
 
II. 
 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We conduct a plenary review of the District Court‟s 
order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 
(3d Cir. 2009).   We accept all factual allegations in the 
Complaint as true, construe it in the light most favorable to 
Allen, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading 
of the Complaint, Allen may be entitled to relief.  See id.  
 
Because this case requires us to construe a 
congressional statute, principles of statutory construction 
apply.  To discern Congress‟ intent we begin with the text.   In 
re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  If the statute‟s plain language is unambiguous 
                                                 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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and expresses that intent with sufficient precision, we need 
not look further.  Id.  If the plain language fails to express 
Congress‟ intent unequivocally, however, we will examine 
the surrounding words and provisions in their context.  
Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Assuming that every word in a statute has meaning, we avoid 
interpreting part of a statute so as to render another part 
superfluous.  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 
III. 
 
Analysis 
 
 Congress made its purpose in enacting the FDCPA 
explicit: “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by 
debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who 
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State 
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).  Section 1692f(1) on which Allen relies 
provides: 
           
A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable 
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 
Without limiting the general application of the  
foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this    
section: 
 
(1) The collection of any amount (including any 
interest, fee, charge, or expense  incidental to the 
principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly 
authorized by the agreement creating the debt or 
permitted by law. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Notably, § 1692f(1) specifically prohibits the 
“collection” of any unauthorized amount and Allen alleges 
only that FSKS and LaSalle attempted to collect such 
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Attorneys, such as FSKS, are regarded as debt 
collectors, and their conduct as such is regulated by the 
FDCPA.  See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995) 
(“the term „debt collector‟ . . . applies to [attorneys] who 
„regularly,‟ through litigation, tr[y] to collect consumer 
debts”).  The Act entitles consumers to certain information 
regarding the nature of their debts, § 1692g, and prohibits 
debt collectors from engaging in certain conduct, see §§ 
1692c-1692f, 1692j-1692k.  The FDCPA is a remedial 
statute, and we construe its language broadly so as to effect 
its purposes.  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Section 1692e proscribes “any false, deceptive or 
misleading representation,” (emphasis added), and § 1692d 
similarly condemns “any conduct the natural consequence of 
which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person,” (emphasis 
added).  
 
A “consumer” includes “any natural person obligated 
or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.”  § 1692a(3).  A 
“communication” constitutes “the conveying of information 
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through 
any medium.”5  § 1692a(2) (emphasis added).  The focus of § 
1692f is on the conduct of the debt collector.  
                                                                                                             
amounts from her.  Section 1692f, however, broadly prohibits 
improper means “to collect or attempt to collect” any debt, 
and its list of violative conduct in § 1692f  is not exhaustive.  
Thus, “collection” in § 1692f(1) includes attempted collection 
as well as actual collection. 
 
 
5
 The two letters FSKS sent on June 7, 2007 undoubtedl y 
fall within this definition. FSKS disputes in a footnote the 
characterization of the third letter, which was sent the next 
day and itemized FSKS‟s fees and costs, as a communication 
within the meaning of the FDCPA because it “does not make 
any specific request for payment.”  Br. of Appellee FSKS at 
26 n.9.  A communication, however, is “the conveying of 
information regarding a debt” and is not limited to specific 
requests for payment. § 1692a(2). 
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As noted above, the issue here is whether § 1692f(1) 
governs communications from a debt collector to a 
consumer‟s attorney, such as FSKS‟s letters to  Allen‟s 
attorney.  The attorney for FSKS conceded at oral argument 
that there is nothing in the FDCPA that explicitly exempts 
communications to an attorney.  Unquestionably, the scope of 
the FDCPA is broad.  Indeed, § 1692f(1) prohibits “unfair or 
unconscionable means,” regardless of the person to whom the 
communication was directed.  The FDCPA similarly defines a 
“communication” expansively.  A communication to a 
consumer‟s attorney is undoubtedly an indirect 
communication to the consumer.  Evory, 505 F.3d at 773 
(quoting § 1692a(2)); see also Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 232-33.
6
 
  
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute to the extent it 
imposes liability without proof of an intentional violation.
7
  
                                                                                                             
 
6
 We depart from the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in 
Sayyed that the Supreme Court‟s decision in Heintz supported 
its conclusion that communications from a debt collector to a 
consumer‟s attorney are governed by the FDCPA.  See 
Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 230.  The Court in Heintz addressed the 
narrow issue of whether the term “debt collector” in the 
FDCPA applies to attorneys who regularly, through litigation, 
try to collect consumer debts.  Heintz, 514 U.S. at 292.  
Although the Heintz opinion referred to the fact that the 
communication there had been sent to the consumer‟s 
attorney, the Court did not pass on the precise question before 
us.  See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 937-38 (criticizing Sayyed‟s 
use of Heintz).  
 
7
 The characterization of the FDCPA as a strict liability 
statute is generally accepted.  See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Unifund 
CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. , 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2010); Ellis v. Solomon and Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130, 
135 (2d Cir. 2010); Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 
805 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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See § 1692k.  If an otherwise improper communication would 
escape FDCPA liability simply because that communication 
was directed to a consumer‟s attorney, it would undermine 
the deterrent effect of strict liability.     
 
 In this case, the District Court sub silentio concluded 
that a communication from a debt collector to a consumer‟s 
attorney was generally covered by the FDCPA but that it is to 
be analyzed from the perspective of a competent attorney.  
The District Court, however, did not have the benefit of 
Allen‟s concession that her claims were predicated only upon 
§ 1692f(1), which defines the collection of an unauthorized 
debt as a per se “unfair or unconscionable” debt collection 
method.  The only inquiry under § 1692f(1) is whether the 
amount collected was expressly authorized by the agreement 
creating the debt or permitted by law, an issue we leave for 
the District Court.   
 
Given the nature of its disposition, the District Court 
did not address any of the other issues raised by the parties, 
including whether New Jersey‟s litigation privilege creates an 
exemption to FDCPA liability, an issue raised by FSKS. We 
address this argument briefly because it raises an issue of law 
which is likely to arise on remand. 
 
 New Jersey‟s litigation privilege applies to “any 
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized 
by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that 
have some connection or logical relation to the action.”  
Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. 1995) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  FSKS‟s letters here 
undoubtedly fall within this definition.  Nonetheless, the 
FDCPA does not contain an exemption from liability for 
common law privileges.  “[C]ommon law immunities cannot 
trump the [FDCPA]‟s clear application to the litigating 
activities of attorneys,”  Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231, and, like the 
Fourth Circuit, we will not  “disregard the statutory text in 
order to imply some sort of common law privilege,” id. at 
229; see also Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 
10 
 
606, 615-17 (6th Cir. 2009).  The application of the New 
Jersey litigation privilege does not absolve a debt collector 
from liability under the FDCPA.  
 
 Although we remand this case to the District Court, we 
reiterate that we express no opinion as to whether Allen has 
alleged a viable claim.  If the agreement does not expressly 
authorize or state law does not permit the amounts sought, 
Allen has stated a viable claim under § 1692f(1).    
 
In light of our disposition, on remand the District 
Court should reconsider whether to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Allen‟s state law claims, whether to consider 
the alternative grounds for dismissal set forth in the motions 
to dismiss, and whether to certify a class, as requested by 
Allen.  
 
IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this decision.   
 
